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Negotiating Between Unequal Neighbours: 
India’s Role in Nepal’s Recent Constitution-Making 
Process1 
Prakash Bhattarai 
ABSTRACT 
Nepal’s post-conflict constitution-making process has seen the involvement of many 
international actors. While studies on democracy promotion, to this day, mainly focus on 
Western “donors” and international organizations, this paper looks at the role played by 
India in the complicated process of moving from a peace agreement to the establishment 
of an inclusive, democratic constitution in Nepal. More specifically, it is analysed how a 
powerful neighbouring democracy (India) participated in what is essentially a domestic 
negotiation process (constitution-making) with a view to influencing the emerging demo-
cratic regime. In terms of the issues on the negotiation table, the analysis shows that 
India, in pushing for an inclusive constitution, pursued the specific agenda of supporting 
the inclusion of the Madheshis, an ethnic group mostly living in Nepal’s Terai region. In 
terms of negotiation strategies, the paper identifies four different ways in which India 
tried to influence the constitution: high-level dialogue; economic blockade; international 
coalition building; and targeted support of domestic oppositional forces in Nepal. Com-
prehensive as this negotiation strategy was, it only met with partial success. Parameters 
that limited India’s influence included the domestic strength and legitimacy of the official 
Nepali position (elite alignment; popular support) as well as scepticism concerning In-
dia’s role in Nepal, which was reinforced by India’s overly partisan agenda. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
On 21 September 2015, Nepal’s Constituent Assembly (CA) with almost 90 percent of its 
total vote adopted a new constitution for the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal. The 
new constitution was widely welcomed as a great success of a peaceful democratic 
transition in the country (Mishra 2015, Pokhrel 2015). Since the first CA election held in 
April 2008, major political forces in Nepal had spent almost eight years in hard-hit negoti-
ations. Nepal’s most recent constitution-making process was particularly complex and 
contentious, as it brought together former warring parties after a decade-long armed 
conflict to jointly craft a democratic constitution and, thereby, consolidate the Compre-
hensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in November 2006. In addition to the main par-
ties – the former Maoist rebels, on the one hand, and the traditional political parties, on 
the other – several interest groups and identity-based organizations that had emerged 
after the end of the armed conflict also actively participated in the negotiations over Ne-
pal’s future constitution. 
Nepal’s post-conflict constitution-making process (2006-2015) was an issue of profound 
interest for many international actors. Western donors such as the United States (US), 
United Kingdom (UK), European Union (EU) and Scandinavian countries, United Nations 
(UN), as well as International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) have supported 
1 This working paper was written in the context of the author’s guest researcher stay upon invitation by the EDP 
network at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) in 2017. The author wishes to thank the EDP network 
members for their valuable comments on his work and gratefully acknowledges the financial support received 
by the network and thus the Leibniz Association. 
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the process in many ways, generally aiming at the establishment of an inclusive, secular, 
decentralized democratic state with broad guarantees for human rights. Many of these 
international actors also advocated for an inclusive and participatory constitution-making 
process. But in addition to the usual democracy promoters, the constitution-making pro-
cess also saw the involvement of Nepal’s neighbours India and China. From the perspec-
tive of international democracy promotion, the role of India is of particular interest. While 
India has generally been described as a reluctant democracy promoter, scholars have 
noted that India became heavily involved in Nepal’s peace and democratization process 
that took place between 2005 and 2008 (Destradi 2012) or was even “very actively” en-
gaged in promoting democracy in Nepal (Mehta 2011). Yet, as this paper shows, India 
remained in fact relatively passive during most of the constitution-making process (2008-
2014) and only started to actively engage shortly before the adoption of the new constitu-
tion (in September 2015) as well as during the implementation phase since September 
2015. 
The aim of the article is to analyse India’s attempt at influencing Nepal’s constitution-
making process. This is done by understanding the interaction between the Indian gov-
ernment and its Nepali counterparts as a process of negotiation. In general terms, the 
article, thus, studies how a powerful neighbouring democracy (India) participated in what 
is essentially a domestic negotiation process (constitution-making) with a view to influ-
encing the emerging democratic regime. 
The negotiating role of India in Nepal’s democratization process is an interesting and 
important area of study for three reasons. First, historically, India has had both leverages 
and linkages to significantly influence political developments in Nepal ever since the 
1950s (Grävingholt et al. 2013, Bhatta 2013). At the same time, India has traditionally 
perceived Nepal as its sphere of influence (Campbell 2012). India’s foreign-policy inter-
ests in Nepal are based on the economic ties with Nepal, security concerns due to possi-
ble spillover of violent conflict across the common border, and India’s deeper interest in 
continuing its political hegemony over its immediate neighbouring country. In this regard, 
this article offers a case study of why and how a regional hegemon tries to influence the 
constitution-making process of a less powerful neighbouring country. 
Second, this study’s contribution lies in illuminating the role of a non-typical democracy 
promoter. In carrying forward existing studies on India (See Destradi 2012, Grävingholt et 
al. 2013, Mehta 2011), it expands our knowledge on how a “non-Western” country has 
tried to influence the constitution-making process of a third country and how, in the pro-
cess, democracy-related concerns and more traditional foreign-policy goals are articulat-
ed. 
Finally, despite being a key actor in Nepal’s domestic politics, no efforts have been taken 
so far to analyse the process, methods, and impact of India’s role in the constitution-
making process. In analysing India’s aims and strategies vis-à-vis the constitution-making 
process in Nepal as well as the Nepali political leadership’s responses, the article offers 
important insights into the dynamics of interaction between these two countries at a 
crucial time period. 
This article includes both primary and secondary sources of information. The article par-
ticularly draws upon Nepali, Indian, and some international media reports and news cov-
erage published between July 2015 and June 2017. The author has also conducted inter-
views with 10 Nepali scholars and practitioners particularly from media, civil society, and 
academia. 
This article begins with a short introduction to Nepal-India relationship with special refer-
ence to India’s stakes in Nepal’s political development from past to present. The article 
then sheds light on the process of negotiation between India and Nepal during the most 
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recent constitution-making process, focusing on India’s negotiation strategies during the 
final stages briefly before the adoption of the new constitution and afterwards, in which 
India became particularly involved. In a nutshell, the analysis shows that India, in pushing 
for an inclusive constitution, in fact pursued a rather specific agenda that was driven by 
strategic considerations: to support the inclusion and representation of the Madheshis, 
an ethnic group mostly living in Nepal’s Terai region (issue of negotiation). India’s negoti-
ation strategies included high-level dialogue, economic blockade, international coalition 
building, as well as the targeted support of domestic oppositional forces in Nepal. Com-
prehensive as this negotiation strategy was, it only met with partial success. Parameters 
that limited India’s influence included the domestic strength and legitimacy of the official 
Nepali position (elite alignment; popular support) as well as skepticism concerning In-
dia’s role in Nepal, which was reinforced by India’s overly partisan agenda. 
2 THE NEPAL-INDIA RELATIONSHIP AND INDIA’S STAKES IN NEPAL’S POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
In light of its open border with Nepal and, to a large degree, common culture, traditions 
and religion, India has been leveraging Nepal’s policy since 1950’s. India played a key role 
in negotiating deals between the autocratic Rana Regime, King Tribhuvan, and Nepali 
Congress during the 1950s, and thus paved the way for Nepal’s first experiment with de-
mocracy. India was one of the key backers of the 1990’s nonviolent People’s Movement 
jointly led by the Nepali Congress and the Left Alliance that fought against the King in 
order to establish a multiparty democracy. India was also supportive of the People’s 
Movement’s success in bringing down King Gyanendra’s authoritative regime in 2006. 
With its active and facilitative role to bring the Maoist and mainstream political parties of 
Nepal together to sign the 12-point agreement in October 2005, India can also rightly be 
considered to be an important actor of the peace process over the past decade 
(Majumder 2015, Bhattarai 2016). This deal between the Maoist rebels and the Seven 
Party Alliance (SPA) was instrumental to the success of the People’s Movement and en-
abled the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) between the Maoists and the Government 
of Nepal in 2006 and, eventually, the CA election in 2008. In sum, since the 1950s, India 
has been an important actor in Nepal’s domestic politics and, in several instances, con-
tributed to democratic developments in the country. 
With a view to Nepal’s most recent constitution-making process, India officially empha-
sized its desire to see the country becoming a peaceful, stable, developed, and democrat-
ic state (GOI 2015). India’s interference in the constitutional debate had the declared aim 
of encouraging the major parties to increase the document’s legitimacy (ICG 2016). But, 
as in previous cases of Indian involvement in Nepal’s internal affairs, this official position 
was also defined by Nepal’s geo-political reality as seen through the lenses of Indian poli-
cymakers (Campbell 2012, Bhatta 2013). In fact, India has had direct and indirect inter-
ests in Nepal’s constitution-making process, as the provisions of the new constitution of 
Nepal would have an impact on India’s national security and wider foreign policy, on bi-
lateral economic relations as well as on water resource management.  
India’s neighbourly concerns are closely tied to the Southern Nepali border. India has long 
supported the interests of the Madheshis, one major ethnic group mostly living in the 
Terai region of Nepal. The Madheshis share close family, cultural, and ethnic ties with 
people in bordering Indian states. Perceived discrimination against the Madheshi – from 
the Indian perspective a relevant factor during the constitution drafting process as well – 
hits a nerve with those Indians who consider this a discrimination against their own blood 
(Majumder 2015). Beyond this emotional connection, discontent and unrest among 
Madheshi populations has a clear security dimension for India: due to adjoining borders 
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with India’s two most densely populated states, it is much concerned about spillover ef-
fects of continuous protests in Terai region of Nepal. 
These circumstances have shaped India’s thinking on and attempts at influencing the 
recent Nepali constitution making process. India has interpreted the new constitution as 
detrimental to the interests of the Madheshi population (RSTV 2015). India has long been 
pro-active on behalf of Madheshi population and was witness to the 2008 agreement 
between the Government of Nepal and Madheshi parties (Jaiswal 2016) which focused 
on finding political solutions on pressing Madheshi grievances. As per the views of 
Madheshi leaders, their grievances are associated with too little political representation 
of their people in the parliament, discriminatory constitutional provisions that do not suf-
ficiently guarantee citizenship rights of the people from the Terai region, and the unful-
filled demand of delineating federal states according to the interest of Terai-based politi-
cal parties. 
Not surprisingly then, it was in reaction to the recent widespread discontent with the new 
constitution among the Madheshi that India called upon the Nepali government to 
guarantee broad-based consensus and inclusivity of a renewed constitution-making pro-
cess as well as to allow for the construction of federal states. Terai-based parties, ac-
cording to India, needed their interests to be considered by the three major political par-
ties in Nepali Congress, Nepal Communist Party, United Marxist and Leninist (CPN-UML), 
and United Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) and included in the constitution. India ar-
gued that a constitution which has not garnered support from all segments of society 
may have the potential to spread violence not only within the country, but also to spill 
over the open border into India (Majumder 2015). An “inclusive” constitution on the other 
hand would bring peace and stability in Nepal, as India argues, it would thus also serve 
India’s security concerns (Jaiswal 2016). 
According to media reports from both Nepal and India, and interviews with Nepali schol-
ars and practitioners active in media, civil society, and academia, the three major Indian 
interests with regard to Nepal’s constitution are related to the construction of federal 
states in the Terai region, a constitutional guarantee for the adequate representation of 
the Madheshi community in different state organs, and citizenship rights of Indian wom-
en married to Nepali nationals, particularly in bordering districts of Nepal (Mazumder 
2015). India’s deep interest in the construction of federal states in the Terai region and 
adequate representation of Madheshi people in different state organs was driven by the 
assumption that this would enable India to influence Nepal’s decision-making on issues 
around water resource management, foreign policy, security policy and many more (Inter-
view 1, February 2017).  
It has also been reported that the Indian political elites are interested in keeping Nepal as 
a Hindu state instead of it becoming a secular state as provided by the new constitution 
(Interview 1, 2016). Due to the rise of Hinduism, Indian elites, particularly the present Indi-
an government, oppose the idea of Nepal becoming a secular state. Despite strong pres-
sure on Nepali political actors (Interview 2, 3, & 4, February 2017), it became evident that 
the Nepali domestic political environment, including high-ranking leaders from all political 
parties, was in favour of secularism. Secularism had also been one key demand of the 
Maoists since they started their armed struggle. This agenda was further backed by a 
number of ethnic groups that had emerged since 2007 (Interview 1, February 2017). Alt-
hough secularism is widely perceived as one key demand on the negotiation agenda on 
the Indian side, this issue is not well covered in the media. For the purposes of this article, 
it will therefore not be considered further. 
Moreover, India’s involvement in Nepal’s constitution-making process has also allegedly 
been spurred by minimizing the growing presence and influence of China as well as 
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Western countries in its neighbouring nation (Bhatta 2013). India considers itself to be 
the sole regional power in South Asia (Interview 2&3, 2016). If any problems arise in the 
region, India has often attempted to seek for possible interventions, except in Pakistan. 
Its continued involvement in Nepali affairs can thus be interpreted as a signal underlining 
India’s regional dominance. Moreover, as a matter of perceived respect, it is difficult for 
India to accept, possibly even intolerable, that the three major political parties of Nepal 
would ignore its calls for inclusion of the Madheshi during the constitution writing pro-
cess. Considering Nepal’s weak state institutions, the desire to produce a favourable 
outcome of the constitution-making process as well as to take credit for solving Nepal’s 
problems may also have played a role (Interview 2 & 3, 2016). India also believes that it 
has an ability to counter Western influence in the region (Interview 2, 3&4, 2016). With the 
growing presence of China and Western countries in post-conflict Nepal, India is deeply 
concerned about losing influence, thus looking for avenues through which it could send a 
message of it being the most influential power in Nepal. Nepal’s constitution-making 
process was an opportunity for such a message. 
3 INDIAN NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES AND NEPAL’S RESPONSE  
India was involved in multifaceted negotiations with Nepal’s political leadership during 
the constitution-making process. India’s involvement in Nepal’s most recent political af-
fairs began in late 2005 even before the first CA election, and its role during that time was 
focused on facilitating and providing a venue for dialogue between the SPA and Maoists 
(ICG 2007, Destradi 2012). This dialogue eventually led to the successful signing of a 12 
point agreement between the SPA and the Maoists, which created a foundation for the 
nonviolent People’s Movement against the monarchy in April 2006, the signing of the CPA 
in November 2006, and the beginning of constitution making process. During the first CA 
election period, India offered advice and physical support in the form of vehicles for the 
successful conduction of the CA. India also repeatedly sent its deputy chief election 
commissioner and other senior officials to advise the Election Commission of Nepal. 
Early on, India also appointed a focal person to pay special attention to Nepal’s political 
development and constitution-making process.2 
India’s agenda with regard to Nepal’s constitution-making process has remained relative-
ly stable over time. Fundamentally, India has, through different means, consistently ex-
pressed that the constitution as it was taking shape and was then eventually adopted 
was not ‘broad-based’ – meaning inclusive – from both the process and content point of 
view (Majumder 2015). Although India used its political and diplomatic channels for in-
fluencing the drafting process and despite its long-time economic and political influence 
over Nepal, its efforts were quite unsuccessful – in spite of the fact that India had easy 
access to top rank political leaders from all major political parties and in spite of the 
pressure that it applied on the Nepali political leadership in order for its concerns to final-
ly be adequately addressed. 
Realizing that its attempts at influencing the new constitution were likely to fail, India 
became especially active in the weeks before the constitution was to be promulgated. At 
that time, its key strategy became postponing the date of adoption. When that strategy 
failed and the constitution was adopted with more than 85 percent of the total votes of 
CA members, India then focused on amending the constitution according to its wishes. 
According to a news report (Indian Express) in late September 2015, which quoted an 
anonymous source from the Indian External Affairs Ministry, the Indian government basi-
                                                 
 
2  Initially, this role was performed by Shyam Sharan former Indian ambassador to Nepal. Later on, this role 
was taken over by India’s resident ambassadors to Nepal. 
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cally demanded the adoption of seven major amendments to address the concerns of 
Madheshis and Terai based political parties. According to the report, all Indian concerns 
were “conveyed to Nepal’s leadership through official channels” (Rawat 2015). The seven 
amendments were the following: a) the crafting of electoral constituencies in proportion 
to the population, b) the right to participate in state structures on the basis of principles 
of proportional inclusion, c) enabling citizens by descent or naturalization to run for and 
hold all key political offices including President, Vice-President, Prime Minister, Chief 
Justice, Speaker of Parliament, Chairperson of National Assembly, Head of Province, 
Chief Minister, Speaker of Provincial Assembly and Chief of Security Bodies, d) represen-
tation in National Assembly to be based on population of the Provinces, e) delineation of 
federal states, f) delineation of electoral constituencies every 10 years, and g) acquisition 
of naturalized citizenship to be automatic on application (Roy 2015). 
During the late stages of constitution writing as well as the post-adoption phase, India 
mainly pursued four negotiation strategies in order to influence the constitution writing 
and amending process in Nepal. India intensively made use of high-level dialogue through 
its political and diplomatic channels to express its concerns and reservations. When Indi-
an leaders and officials realised that adoption without recognition of India’s demands 
was imminent, visits of Indian officials to Nepal and meeting requests by the embassy in 
Kathmandu to political leaders and ministers intensified notably. When India’s political 
and diplomatic efforts were not successful, it used economic blockade as a tool to in-
crease its bargaining power over Nepal and particularly in order to bring about substantial 
amendments to the newly adopted constitution according to its wishes. Officially, India 
rejected any responsibility for the blockade, which it attributed solely to the disaffected 
parts of the population that felt underrepresented and thus created disruptions. It is likely, 
however, that the Indian government at least did play a role in facilitating the blockade. 
India also attempted to bring other international actors on board to have a common view 
regarding Nepal’s constitution-making process, thus taking efforts at coalition building 
with other international actors. India tends to be hesitant to collaborate with other inter-
national actors on Nepal’s matters considering that such effort will increase other actors’ 
influence on Nepal. However, the matter of amending the constitution was so important 
that India even engaged with other external actors. Finally, India also remained quite stra-
tegic in terms of strengthening relationships with dissatisfied domestic political forces mo-
bilising against the government and mainstream political parties, as it lend moral and 
political support to the expression of grievances. 
India used these different negotiation techniques at different points in time. In the follow-
ing, these strategies are illuminated further. The following section also provides an as-
sessment regarding their success in influencing Nepali leaders’ decision-making. 
3.1 High-level political and diplomatic dialogue  
The Indian Embassy in Kathmandu became quite active during the final phase (August-
September 2015) of the constitution-making process and intensely lobbied to change the 
draft constitution in order to reflect India’s concerns. Ranjeet Rae, former Indian ambas-
sador to Nepal, did several trips between Kathmandu and New Delhi for consultation with 
his government on how to best engage with the Nepali leadership (Roy 2015). On 25 Au-
gust 2015, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi himself made a phone call to his 
Nepali counterpart Sushil Koirala and expressed his concerns regarding a nonviolent and 
truly inclusive constitution-making process (Roy 2015). As the time of the scheduled 
adoption drew closer, a number of press statements were released from the Indian side 
highlighting the need for broad-based consensus and a nonviolent constitution writing 
process. For example, the External Affairs Minister of India issued a press statement on 
14 September 2015, just a week before the promulgation of the new constitution. The 
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press statement emphasised India’s firm commitment to support peace, stability, unity, 
and development in Nepal and underlined India’s long-standing support to Nepal whenev-
er it had faced political crises and natural disasters. It also praised the progress that the 
Constituent Assembly had already made, including the resolution of several contentious 
issues. However, the statement then expressed deep concern regarding the ongoing pro-
tests and strife in several parts of Nepal and urged for “continuing flexibility on the part of 
all the political forces so that any outstanding issues are addressed through dialogue and 
widest possible agreement, in an atmosphere free from violence” (GOI 2015a). The need 
for a “durable and resilient Constitution” to build a modern Nepal was also highlighted. 
This press statement was the first public attempt to communicate India’s concerns and 
dissatisfaction and can thus be understood as a desperate attempt to increase the pres-
sure on Nepali political leadership.  
One high-profile attempt at changing the constitutional draft at the last minute was also 
the Indian Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jayshankar’s visit to Nepal on 17-18 Sep-
tember 2015 (Interview 1, 2&3 February 2017). Jayshankar came as special envoy of 
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and met with key political leaders of Nepal including 
the Prime Minister as well as the leaders of all political parties, among them also the 
Madheshi leaders. His key message was that it was crucial to “ensure widest possible 
agreement on constitution for peace and stability in the country” (Majumder 2015). Jay-
shankar told KP Sharma Oli, top leader of the CPN-UML, that “it would have been better if 
the disgruntled Madhesh-based parties were brought on board the constitution drafting 
process before promulgating the new constitution” (TKP 2015b). In response, Oli merely 
pointed out that the new constitution had been adopted with the approval of more than 
85 percent of lawmakers and in the presence of 90 percent of the total CA members. 
When Jayshankar raised India’s security concerns with the UCPN-Maoist Chairman Dahal, 
the latter emphasised that Nepal was indeed more concerned than India about the dete-
riorating security situation in Terai. Dahal also went as far as commenting that the timing 
of Jayshankar’s visit just before the promulgation of constitution was inappropriate, as it 
gave a negative impression regarding India’s roles and presence in Nepal. Jayshankar’s 
meeting with the prime minister ended more amicably; Koirala assured the Indian envoy 
that a ‘win-win solution’ to the problems associated with Nepal’s constitution-making 
process would be found (TKP 2015e). 
Following Jayshankar’s departure, he issued a press statement warning that the comple-
tion of the constitution-making process should “be an occasion for joy and satisfaction, 
not agitation and violence” (EOI 2015). He also called upon Nepali political leaders to 
“display the necessary flexibility and maturity at this crucial time to ensure a durable and 
resilient Constitution that has broad-based acceptance” (Jaiswal 2016). In sum, Jayshan-
kar put notable pressure on the Nepalese government and top-level political leadership to 
delay the adoption of the constitution, hold discussions with political groups opposed to 
it, and make it widely acceptable to all groups, particularly the Madhesh-based political 
leaders (Majumder 2015).  
However, Jayshankar’s proposal was rejected by all top-level Nepali political leaders who 
were committed to adopting the new constitution on schedule. Thus, despite India’s dip-
lomatic and political pressure on the eve of promulgating the new constitution and de-
spite the top level Nepali political leaders’ assurance to find a mid-way solution to ad-
dress the concerns of dissatisfied groups with the draft of the constitution, the three ma-
jor political parties in Nepali Congress, CPN (UML), and UCPN (Maoist) took a bold deci-
sion to adopt the new constitution on the stipulated date. Indian establishment became 
quite frustrated with the Nepali political leadership for not taking their advice seriously. 
As a result, the Indian government did not welcome the constitution but only formally 
“noted” that a constitution had been adopted in Nepal. Such step taken by India was not 
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only the beginning of a diplomatic crisis, but also a contributing factor to increase anti-
India sentiment in Nepal. 
In the following weeks and months, several high-level meetings attempted to relieve 
strains in the bilateral relationship. India’s lukewarm reception of the new constitution 
caused resentment in Nepal. Moreover, the intensity of aggression and confrontation was 
growing at various places in the Terai region due to the protests by Terai based parties’ 
dissatisfaction with the newly adopted constitution. 
Following the contentious relationship between Nepal and India after the promulgation of 
the new constitution, Nepal’s Prime Minister Koirala and Indian Ambassador Rae met in 
Kathmandu on 23 September 2015 (Bhattarai 2015a). This meeting particularly focused 
on discussing the differences and the resentment between the two countries after the 
promulgation of the new constitution. Although the details regarding this meeting were 
not published, Dinesh Bhattarai, the then Prime Minister's Foreign Affairs Advisor, briefly 
told to the press that positive talks were held between them regarding the Nepali-Indian 
relationship after the promulgation of the new constitution. During this meeting, Prime 
Minister Koirala had assured ambassador Rae to take the initiative to resolve the issues 
with the dissenting Terai-centric political parties by bringing them on board for talks (TRN 
2015) and if needed amend the constitution. 
Another important meeting on the same day (i.e. 23 September 2015) took place in New 
Delhi between the then Nepali ambassador to India Deep Kumar Upadhyay and Indian 
Prime Minister’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval. During this meeting Doval gave a 
clear message to Upadhyay for ”an immediate need for political dialogue and consensus 
between the concerned stakeholders” in Nepal (Bhattarai 2015a). Doval once again em-
phasised the need for a broad-based consensus among Nepali stakeholders regarding 
the content of the new constitution. What exactly Nepali ambassador responded to 
Doval’s concerns is not clear, yet both sides reiterated their goodwill to maintain dialogue 
and foster mutual understanding after the Indian Prime Minister expressed his serious 
concerns over the straining ties between two neighbours in the post-constitution period 
of Nepal. 
Several high level exchanges followed. For instance, one such exchange took place in 
Kathmandu on 12 October 2015 between Nepal’s new Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and 
Indian ambassador Rae on finding ways to improve the contentious Indo-Nepal relation-
ships as result of an unofficial economic blockade imposed by the Indian side (see also 
section below). In the meeting, Prime Minister Oli reiterated his government’s priority on 
the long and fruitful ties with India for the mutual benefit of both countries, where Am-
bassador Rae repeated the same rhetoric that the blockade was not imposed by India 
(RSTV 2015). As a continuation of high level exchanges, Prime Minister Oli sent his For-
eign Minister Kamal Thapa for a visit to India in the third week of October 2015 where he 
called on the Indian political leadership to ensure the trade of essential goods across the 
common border (see below). In response, the Indian political leadership reportedly 
reemphasised that India was not behind the economic blockade, but that it was rather the 
insecurity in the Nepali-Indian border that disrupted the movement of vehicles. Likewise, 
during his different high-level meetings with India’s External Affairs Minister, Home Minis-
ter and National Security Adviser of India, concerns were raised about the delay in consti-
tution amendment to address the grievances of the Madheshi groups over the delineation 
of federal states and gave a clear indication that relations between the two countries 
would not improve without addressing the problems in Terai. In response to their con-
cerns, Minister Thapa briefed them about Nepal government’s initiation of forming a high-
level political committee to hold talks with the disgruntled groups and the beginning of 
dialogue process to resolve problem through talks and consensus (Bhattarai 2015b). 
Although Minister Thapa claimed that his visit was successful in bringing Nepali-Indian 
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ties back on track, the stance of India regarding Nepal’s constitution-making process 
remained unchanged. 
Following Nepal’s Foreign Minister’s visit to India, Prime Minister Oli called his Indian 
counterpart Narendra Modi on 31 December 2015. During the 20 minutes long conversa-
tion, Oli discussed the obstructions at the Nepali-Indian border points and requested 
Modi to take initiatives to ease supply of essential commodities through different border 
points. In response, Modi once again stressed on finding a “sahamati” (broad based con-
sensus) on the constitution by bringing the conflicting parties into dialogue. He also re-
peated the same rhetoric that restrictions at border-points were due to the protests on 
the Nepali side and that the Indian government had no role in the halt of supplies. He 
moreover issued an invitation for Oli to come to visit India (TKP 2015c, Giri 2016). 
Following this invitation, Prime Minister Oli paid a 6-day State Visit to India from 19 to 24 
February 2016. This visit was mainly focused on ending the blockade and improving the 
shaky relationships between India and Nepal that emerged after the promulgation of Ne-
pal’s new constitution. During a joint press meeting Oli stated that his visit was aimed at 
bringing bilateral relations back on track. In response, Indian Prime Minister Modi appre-
ciated that Nepal’s constitution-making process is an important achievement Nepal has 
made in its democratic process (MoFA 2016b). Yet, Modi once again conveyed to Oli that 
the new constitution could only be successful after resolving contentious issues through 
consensus and dialogue in a time-bound manner. Modi also gave emphasis on the fact 
that a volatile situation in Nepal on constitution related issues would have a direct impact 
on India (First-Post 2016). 
Nepal’s new Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s State visit to India from 15-18 Sep-
tember 2016 was another effort from the Nepali side to improve its relationships and 
build trust with India. In this regard, Nepal’s Prime Minister Dahal, giving an official ad-
dress in Hyderabad House, New Delhi expressed his government’s efforts to take all sec-
tions of Nepali society on board for the effective implementation of the constitution. In 
response, Prime Minister Modi appreciated his efforts of the constitutional consolidation 
of democracy in Nepal and also welcomed the ongoing efforts of the Government of Ne-
pal to take all sections of the society on board for effective implementation of the consti-
tution (The Hindu 2016, MoFA 2016a). Although India welcomed the efforts, their key 
negotiation agenda such as the assurance of broad-based consensus was still highlight-
ed. As reported by The Hindu, Indian Foreign Secretary Jayshankar hinted that India 
would not back off from its engagement with the Madhesh issue. He also believed that 
the constitution of Nepal would go for full fledge implementation only accommodating 
the grievances of all sections of Nepalese society, which at present is lacking (The-Hindu 
2016). 
3.2 Economic Blockade 
When the diplomatic and political negotiation attempts did not work according to plan, 
India, by (unofficially) imposing an economic blockade on 21 September 2015, took a 
more aggressive approach to increase its leverage. This represents the most extreme 
expression of India's dissatisfaction with Nepali political leadership. The blockade, obvi-
ously, was never an official act; India repeatedly denied any connection to it and pointed 
to the political unrest in the Terai region as responsible. In effect, the transportation of 
most essential goods such as petroleum products was interrupted several times at the 
Nepal-India border. This escalation led to a severe crisis in the diplomatic relationship 
between the two neighbours and there was a rapid rise of anti-India sentiments in Nepal.  
India practically ignored appeals by Nepali leadership to end the blockade. For example, 
on 25 September 2015, four days after the adoption of the new constitution, Nepal’s 
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Prime Minister Sushil Koirala and CPN-UML leaders KP Oli and Madhav Kumar Nepal – in 
separate meetings – drew attention to this issue with Indian Ambassador to Nepal Ranjit 
Rae. The Nepali policymakers asked for clearance of Nepal-bound cargo stranded on the 
Indian side of the border and also stressed the need to improve the strained relationships 
between the two countries through dialogue. Responding to senior leaders’ comments, 
the Indian ambassador denied any responsibility for the obstruction of the movement of 
vehicles with goods to Nepal. Rather, political unrest in the border region due to massive 
dissatisfaction with the constitution-making process was to blame (Haidar 2015, TKP 
2015a, Giri 2015). Ambassador Rae repeated his comments as speaker at a meeting or-
ganised by the Nepal-India Friendship Association on 29 September 2015, where he also 
assured Nepali leaders that India was taking the initiative to resolve the crisis (Haidar 
2015, TKP 2015a, Giri 2015). Similar statements were given by other Indian government 
officials from the Ministry of External Affairs, some emphasising that events on the Ne-
pali side of the border were beyond India’s control (Haidar 2015). Likewise, on 3 Decem-
ber 2015, Sushma Swaraj, External Affairs Minister of India in Rajya Sabha, denied any 
economic blockade by India (GOI 2015b). However, Nepali political leaders very clearly 
perceived the economic embargo as an Indian strategy to punish Nepal for promulgating 
its constitution without adequately consulting India. 
3.3 International Advocacy and Coalition Building 
Another negotiation strategy – one that India used probably for the very first time in its 
relationship with Nepal – was leveraging international forums. The Indian delegation, 
during the 23rd Session of the Universal Period Review (UPR) in Geneva on 3 November 
2015, expressed concerns about violence and unrest and the death of 45 people in the 
Tarai region after Nepal adopted the new constitution. In response, Nepal’s Foreign Min-
ister Kamal Thapa clarified that “Nepal has every right to promulgate its constitution on 
its own, and restricting supply of goods from the border is unacceptable” (TKP 2015d). 
Minister Thapa further said that the crisis in Terai was its internal problem that Nepal had 
the capacity to solve on its own. He also noted that the death of 45 people in Terai had 
occurred before the constitution was adopted. He further emphasised that the Nepal 
government was serious about addressing the concerns raised by the Madheshi commu-
nity, and reiterated that the new constitution was written and promulgated in a democrat-
ic manner to accommodate all voices from society (TKP 2015d). 
Another instance of India’s attempts at international advocacy and coalition building on 
the issue was Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the UK on 12-13 November 
2015. Modi and his British counterpart David Cameron issued a joint press statement 
which emphasised the need of a lasting and inclusive constitutional settlement in Nepal 
by addressing the remaining areas of concern in Nepal’s constitution (Myrepublica 
2016b). In response, Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a counter press statement, 
emphasising that constitution-making was an internal matter of the country and that Ne-
pal was capable of handling its internal affairs on its own (Myrepublica 2016b). Similarly, 
India also issued a joint press statement together with the EU in Brussels on 30 March 
2016 during 13th EU-India Summit, reiterating “the need for a lasting and inclusive consti-
tutional settlement in Nepal that will address the remaining Constitutional issues in a 
time bound manner, and promote political stability and economic growth” (EU-India 
2016). Nepal strongly objected to this statement. Issuing a counter statement, Nepal’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 31 March 2016 called upon India and the EU “to fully re-
spect the sovereign and democratic rights of the people of Nepal and refrain from making 
uncalled for statements” (Myrepublica 2016b). Nepal’s statement further recalled that 
“[t]he Government and People of Nepal are fully capable of resolving their issues them-
selves within the framework of the constitution” (MoFA 2016c). 
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3.4 Support for Dissatisfied Groups  
India intended to create pressure on the top level Nepali political leadership through do-
mestic actors as well. For this purpose, it supported the Terai-centric political parties who 
were dissatisfied with some of the provisions of the new constitution and had launched 
protests in Terai immediately after the promulgation of the constitution. The support of 
India to these groups mostly came in the form of solidarity with their protests against the 
government. On several occasions, the Indian embassy in Kathmandu as well as the Gov-
ernment of India invited the top level leadership of Madhesh-originated parties for politi-
cal consultations and discussions on the roadmap of their movement for amending the 
constitution. In the first week of December 2015, senior leaders representing Madheshi 
Morcha (Alliance) paid a visit to India to brief the Indian leaders regarding their ongoing 
mobilisation in the Terai region. During the visit, they met Indian Minister for External 
Affairs Sushma Swaraj who assured India’s moral support to the ongoing (peaceful) pro-
tests in the Terai region to create pressure on the government for amending the constitu-
tion. It is also reported that she called for “broad-based ownership of Constitution and 
encouraged speedy political solution and return to normalcy on that basis” (THT 2015). 
Overall, it was widely perceived that the protests in the Terai region were backed up by 
India. 
Indian officials even went as far as meeting leaders from Madheshi parties in Rajbiraj, the 
epicentre of Terai protest, on 11 May 2016. Deputy Chief of Mission at Kathmandu-based 
Indian Embassy, Vinay Kumar, met with Madheshi leaders to inquire about plans to take 
the protests to Kathmandu. It was reported that, during this meeting, Indian diplomats 
advised the Madheshi leaders “to focus on Capital-centric protests rather than district 
level protests as it is more likely to influence government to address the demands raised 
by Madheshi people,” including demands for constitutional amendments (TKP 2016a). 
Madheshi leaders also received advice from the Indian officials about how to ensure a 
large number of participation in Kathmandu centric protests. Moreover, Indian officials 
also advised the local political leaders to continue their rights based struggle until they 
achieved their goals (TKP 2016a). In addition to these meetings, the Indian ambassador 
to Nepal organised a number of meetings with the leaders of Madheshi parties to discuss 
the future of ongoing protests in the Terai region. 
4 DISCUSSION 
India’s involvement in Nepal’s most recent constitution-making process is a continuation 
of its involvement in the peace and democratization process since 2005. Initially, Indian 
interests were focused on the overall issue of resolving the armed conflict and restoring 
democracy in Nepal; always also in consideration of the fact that such efforts would sta-
bilise the country and protect India’s influence in Nepal (Destradi 2012). Since then, the 
focus of India’s involvement in Nepal’s democratization process has shifted significantly. 
Although India has been involved in negotiations with the Nepali political leadership 
throughout the constitution-making process, the most active negotiation phase was 
shortly before the adoption of the constitution (in September 2015) as well as during the 
implementation phase (since September 2015). From the very beginning until October 
2017, Indian officials emphasised the need for an inclusive constitution and that consul-
tation among all relevant Nepali stakeholders was necessary. India, through different 
means such as high level political dialogue, diplomatic engagement, press releases, and 
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international advocacy and coalition building with other international actors, kept on re-
peating this demand in different languages and by different people until today.3 
India’s negotiation approaches were multifaceted, combining and/or sequencing four 
different strategies to exert influence on the Nepali political leadership. Throughout, India 
used its political and diplomatic channels to lobby for a revision of the constitution. At 
times, this direct dialogue was complemented by teaming up with other diplomatic actors 
such as the EU and the UK in order to issue joint statements on Nepal. Economic sanc-
tions, albeit unofficial, were another negotiation strategy when purely diplomatic efforts 
turned out to be unsuccessful. Moreover, India also worked closely with oppositional 
domestic forces within Nepal in order to increase the pressure on the Nepali political 
leadership from the inside.  
Comprehensive as this set of negotiation strategies was, India’s efforts have only partially 
been successful. The first constituent amendment bill was tabled by the KP Oli govern-
ment just a few months after the promulgation of the constitution. Some amendments to 
the constitution were actually made on 23 January 2016 by a two-third vote. One key 
amendment increased the number of parliamentary seats from the 20 districts of the 
Terai region (GLM 2016). Yet, this amendment neither satisfied India nor the Terai-based 
parties. In early August 2016, the Maoist-Congress alliance came to power with a promise 
to amend the constitution to address the Terai centric parties’ concerns. On 29 November 
2016, the government issued a new constitution amendment bill, which India considered 
an “important step” to accommodate the grievances of the Madheshi groups 
(Myrepublica 2016a, TKP 2016b). Yet, in the end, the amendment bill failed to receive the 
necessary two-thirds majority in the parliament. 
Why was India, with its long-standing influence on its more dependent neighbor, not more 
successful? The analysis of the negotiation process between the two parties suggests 
that four main reasons account for this. First, the immense diplomatic and political pres-
sure met with a high sense of unity among Nepal’s main political leaders and parties. This 
elite alignment enabled, and was reinforced by, the adoption of the new constitution by 
more than 85 percent of the total CA members. Hence, the domestic strength and unity of 
the Nepal’s political elite seriously limited potential access points which India could have 
used to influence the policy-making process at the national level. 
Second, this elite consensus also met with broad popular support in Nepal. Although 
public opinion in Nepal was generally divided with regard to the new constitution, during 
that time most domestic public forces (particularly the left as well as traditional demo-
cratic forces) supported the new constitution. Most were convinced that the constitution 
would resolve key governance, development, inclusion, and political stability problems 
that Nepal had faced over the past 25 years. As a result, pressure from domestic public 
forces on Nepal’s political leadership to adopt the constitution also counteracted India’s 
efforts to revise it. 
Third, among Nepal’s major parties there were also contested opinions regarding India’s 
role in the changed political context of Nepal, which proved another crucial factor that 
limited India’s position in the negotiations with its Nepali counterparts. Particularly, the 
communist parties including the UCPN (Maoist) and CPN (UML) desired to break the 
                                                 
 
3  Recent events have led observers to speculate about a possible change in India’s position vis-à-vis the ongoing 
constitution amendment process in Nepal. In 2017, India’s new ambassador to Nepal Majeev Singh Puri 
pressed the Madhesh-based parties to participate in the local government elections by putting their demand of 
a constitution amendment on hold. Yet, on 16 June 2017, a spokesperson of India’s Ministry of External Affairs 
clarified that “New Delhi has not pressed either the ruling parties or the Madhesh-based parties on constitu-
tional amendments or election-related issues” and that India remained in favor of an inclusive constitution and 
a consultation that would enable broad-based ownership of the document (Bhattarai 2017). 
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traditional Indian influence over Nepal and they saw the constitution-making process as 
an opportunity in this regard. Likewise, the Nepali Congress, the leading democratic force 
at that time, also took a stance in favour of a constitution that was crafted by Nepali peo-
ple with limited or no involvement of international actors including India. In contrast, the 
right-wing parties who were in favour of seeing Nepal as Hindu state and Terai based 
regional parties who wanted to design the new constitution to their advantage, desired to 
take help from the Indian side to make them themselves domestically stronger in the 
constitution negotiation process. However, the groups who wanted to have limited Indian 
involvement in Nepali politics remained more influential and unified than other local 
groups during the constitution-making process. 
Fourth, the way India framed and presented its demands also weakened its position. 
Most notably, while India generally called for an inclusive constitution, in fact it only lob-
bied for the inclusion of one particular ethnic group (the Madheshi) and region (the Terai). 
Such an openly partisan agenda made India ineffective as well as suspicious regarding 
its role in Nepal’s constitution-making process. 
5 CONCLUSION 
Constitution-making processes in post-conflict countries are characterised by the in-
volvement of a whole range of international actors that aim at promoting the transition to 
a peaceful and democratic order. Yet, in practice, whenever governments engage in the 
promotion of democracy and peace, this comes along with more self-centred foreign-
policy goals. This holds for India as it does for more traditional democracy-promoting 
countries, and it is particularly the case in “recipient” countries that are of strategic value 
(such as Nepal for India). Such foreign-policy interests do not necessarily mean that the 
aim to promote democracy is entirely compromised, but it will always shape the ways in 
which democracy promotion is conceptualised and implemented in a given context 
(Wolff, Spanger, and Puhle 2013). This could also be observed in the case of India’s in-
volvement in Nepal’s constitution-making process. While the overall principles supported 
by the Indian government – broad-based consultations, an inclusive constitution – were 
certainly in line with a democracy promotion agenda, they were applied and implemented 
in ways that clearly reflected India’s strategic, economic, and security interests, rather 
than a genuine motive to promote democracy in its neighbouring country. India’s push for 
inclusion of the Madheshi people from the Terai region, in the end, basically aimed at 
securing Indian influence over political decision-making in Nepal. 
The 2015 Constitution of Nepal has been welcomed by most international actors includ-
ing China, US, EU, UK, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Germany who recognised it as a 
historic progress in the political transition of Nepal and as an important step towards 
strengthening and institutionalising democracy (GoN 2016). India, in contrast, did not 
welcome the constitution (GoN 2016). First, whereas India had traditionally played an 
important role in all major political developments in Nepal since the 1950, it did not as-
sume such influential role in the most recent constitution-making process. Second, as 
seen, India was frustrated by certain provisions of Nepal’s new constitution related to the 
construction of federal states and citizenship rights and continued to demand their revi-
sion, even after the constitution was adopted.  
India’s push for an inclusive constitution in Nepal that would consider the legitimate in-
terests of ethnic and regional minorities, is certainly valid when it comes to constructing a 
peaceful and stable democracy in this post-conflict country. However, when it came to 
negotiating this aim with the Nepali counterparts, this article has shown that the strategic 
reasoning behind India’s position has tended to undermine the negotiation strategies 
applied. Also, it has been shown that even powerful states have a hard time influencing 
14 
 
domestic political processes in much weaker neighbouring countries when domestic 
elites are united and rely on democratic legitimacy and popular support. 
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